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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 61
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 4 August 1998 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, and further to our letter dated 27 July 1998 (A/52/996-S/1998/696), I have the honour to draw your attention to new violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus and of the flight information region of Nicosia by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, recorded today, 4 August 1998.

Two Turkish military aircraft RF-4 entered the northern Nicosia flight information region in violation of international air traffic regulations and of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus flying over the area of Kormakiti and the cape of Apostle Andreas, returning then to the Ankara flight information region.

As stated in our previous letters, such unauthorized intrusions into the Nicosia flight information region and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus are in violation of international air traffic rules and, at the same time, they are in contravention with the provisions of the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus, which state that such overflights increase political tension on the island and undermine efforts towards achieving a final settlement.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I wish to protest strongly against these new provocative acts by Turkey, a Member State of the United Nations, against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. These acts are in complete disregard of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant decisions of the Organization on the question of Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) James DROUSHIOTIS
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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A/52/1005
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6 August 1998

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda items 20, 107 and 112
STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, QUESTIONS RELATING TO REFUGEES, RETURNEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS AND HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Identical letters dated 6 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you a statement delivered by the delegation of the State of Eritrea on 5 August 1998 before the fiftieth session of the Commission on Human Rights, Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, currently meeting in Geneva.

The statement details the gross violations of the human rights of Eritrean civilians resident in Ethiopia by the Ethiopian Government.

I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate the text of the present letter and its annex as a document of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 20, 107 and 112, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Haile MENKERIOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Statement delivered by the delegation of the State of Eritrea on 5 August 1998 to the Commission on Human Rights, Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, concerning human rights violations against Eritreans in Ethiopia

1. The Eritrean delegation would like to take this opportunity to present before you the facts of a great abuse of human rights in Ethiopia. It is with great sadness that I am obliged to present the evidence for what is without doubt a crime against humanity. For the last eight weeks, and continuing even as I speak before you today, the Government of Ethiopia has been engaged in a systematic policy of expelling Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin, solely and purely on the basis of their national origin. Up to now, more than 13,000 Eritreans and Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean origin, who have committed no crime, have been arbitrarily arrested, detained, made to disappear and summarily deported, often with great cruelty.

2. We bring you messages of anguish and pain from the victims of this outrage. It is a message from a recently widowed 23-year-old mother who had just lost her sister and was taking care of her invalid mother but was taken away from her seven-month-old baby screaming and begging. It is a message from a 64-year-old, illiterate cleaning woman, an Ethiopian who although of Eritrean ancestry had neither acquired an Eritrean identity card nor voted in the Eritrean referendum for independence. Nor was she a member of the governing party of Eritrea, nor indeed any Eritrean association. Nor, for that matter, could she speak any of Eritrea's languages fluently. It is the message from a 56-year-old man who was dumped in the desert on the Eritrean-Ethiopian border, separated from his daughter, who died after walking more than 4 kilometres to the Eritrean side of the border in 44°C heat. It is a story of a businessman who spent his lifetime investing in Ethiopia, building up that country, most recently constructing the water and sewage system for Addis Ababa, who was arrested at dawn and dispossessed of his business, worth some tens of millions of dollars. It is the shameful story of a 15-year-old girl who was taken away from her family simply because last year she went to Eritrea on vacation to participate in a tree-planting programme. It is the story of the thousands who were expelled with them, and the thousands who remain, fearful that security officers will break down their doors at 5 a.m. and drag them away from their homes and their families with nothing but the clothes that they are wearing.

3. On 23 May, at the closing session of an International Conference to establish the Human Rights Commission in Ethiopia, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi spoke of his Government's commitment to the rule of law and respect for human rights. Seven weeks later, Prime Minister Meles gave a television interview in which he claimed the right of his Government to expel any foreigners it chose. He said: "Any foreigner, whether Eritrean, Japanese, etc., lives in Ethiopia because of the goodwill of the Ethiopian Government. If the Ethiopian Government says, 'Go, because we do not like the colour of your eyes', they have to leave." He went on to compare the expulsions of Eritreans with the

deportation of illegal immigrants from Mexico by the Government of the United States of America.

4. This justification is simply absurd and an affront to the intelligence of the international community. Many of those expelled are Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean origin. All were legally resident in the country. By Prime Minister Meles' own admission, "We cannot expel a citizen of Ethiopia from Ethiopia." Yet that is precisely what his Government is doing. A survey of more than 3,000 deportees from urban areas indicates that 264 had been born in Ethiopia, more than half had lived there for more than 20 years and 421 had lived there for more than 40 years. Some had not even visited Eritrea. Many have married Ethiopians. Among them are more than 600 businessmen and women, including owners of hotels, construction businesses, garages, transportation companies and shops. Many were government employees. There are lawyers, doctors, teachers, photographers, professional cartographers and even priests and nuns. One case we have is that of a former soldier who lost one arm and one leg fighting for Ethiopia against Somalia in the 1977 war. "What more can I give to Ethiopia than an arm and a leg?" he asks.

5. And of course we must not forget more than 8,000 poor farmers and pastoralists, who have been deprived of their meagre livelihoods, and whose cases are just as tragic. Many of these people have lived in Ethiopia for generations, where they own farms and herds of cattle. Overnight these people have been deprived of their livelihoods. Some of them were beaten up and locked in metal cargo containers before being transported to Eritrea.

6. Among those arrested for deportation are citizens of third countries, such as Italy and Canada, who are of Eritrean origin. Through the intervention of their embassies, a few of them have been saved from deportation. Some Eritreans holding foreign passports have had their passports stamped with the words "deported never to return".

7. The citizens who have been deported report that the Ethiopian security forces accused them of membership of the Eritrean Community Association or the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ); of voting in the Eritrean referendum; or of contributing to fund-raising campaigns. In many cases this may be true. But these associations are completely legal in Ethiopia. Fund-raising for Eritrea and participating in development campaigns in Eritrea were completely legal. We find it puzzling that the Ethiopian Government should choose to describe the PFDJ as "a clandestine organization" for, like the other associations, the Ethiopian Government had permitted its activities and even provided premises for them. There was moreover a reciprocal arrangement with Ethiopia that allowed for Ethiopians in Eritrea and TPLF organizations in Eritrea to undertake similar activities with similar provisions. There can be no grounds for retroactively declaring these activities illegal or citing them as grounds for deportation.

8. The discriminatory acts were undertaken without any due process of law and without any right of appeal.

9. There is no basis in the Ethiopian Constitution or penal code, nor in international human rights law for this systematic mass expulsion of these

people. It is quite simply an illegal and arbitrary act of ethnic cleansing which has no justification in law whatsoever.

10. Although the Government of Ethiopia has made no official statement and passed no law to this effect, it is clear that its aim also includes depriving deportees of Eritrean origin of their Ethiopian citizenship. Please, stop and ponder for a moment the implications of this act: a State has withdrawn citizenship from thousands of law-abiding citizens simply because of their ethnic or national origin. People have been rendered stateless without due process of law. Surely, this is a precedent that this Commission cannot allow to stand.

11. Ethiopia claims that the Eritreans in Ethiopia are spies, infiltrators and saboteurs who threaten the security of the State. Ethiopia has indeed declared war on Eritrea and I am sure that the Ethiopian Government will argue that it can derogate from the human rights provisions in the Constitution and penal code in the name of national security. If that is the case, then Eritreans in Ethiopia should be considered "protected persons" under article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

12. Let us have no doubt as to what the Geneva Conventions permit and what they prohibit. Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention makes it crystal clear that any action against protected persons must be carried out on an individual, case-by-case basis. Article 41 says that the Government may take no action more severe than assigned residence or internment. Article 49 begins:

> "Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons ... are prohibited, regardless of their motive."

Article 147 lists "unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement" of protected persons among grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, i.e., actions for which international law dictates there is individual criminal responsibility. In addition, article 18 of the 1996 draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind lists five "crimes against humanity": among them "forcible transfer of population".

13. Let us recall that when the Geneva Conventions were written in 1949, Europe had just emerged from war and genocide of unparalleled scale. The memories of concentration camps, forced deportations of populations and the Holocaust were fresh in the minds of the men and women who established the foundations of international humanitarian law. Similarly, the memories of the Red Terror and the war crimes of successive Ethiopian regimes were fresh in the minds of the Ethiopian Government when they set up the office of the Special Prosecutor to bring officials of the former regime to trial. Just a few months ago, the memory of the genocide in Rwanda moved Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to propose to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) a Panel of Eminent Personalities to investigate that crime. We supported both those initiatives. The people of Africa, including Eritreans and Ethiopians, have suffered too much already. We never thought that this Ethiopian Government, which came to power after years of struggle against tyranny, with the promise of peace and respect for human rights, would itself perpetuate a crime against humanity. Yet the evidence I am

presenting to you today compels us to conclude that the Government of Ethiopia is doing precisely that.

14. This gross crime against humanity is also an aggregation of many smaller, cruel crimes against individuals. The deportees describe how they were seized from their homes or places of work. Sometimes they were woken up in the middle of the night. Often they were told that they were just wanted for a quick registration, and would return home shortly. One mother locked the door of her house, leaving her small son sleeping inside, because the security officers said she would be back in a few minutes. Others have begged the policemen to be allowed to take their children, but have been herded onto buses without even having a chance to say goodbye. They have been insulted in police stations and sent on long and arduous bus journeys with virtually no food and water. Those deported to Assab had to walk for 4 kilometres in the scorching desert heat. Contrary to the claims of the Ethiopian Government, the deportees report no presence of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) during their journeys.

15. A report from a joint mission to Assab by the United Nations agencies confirms these facts. It also describes one particularly sad case, that of a 56-year-old former teacher:

> "The deplorable and dehumanizing conditions caused the death of one man whose daughter was snatched away by Ethiopian authorities when the deportees were dropped off between the border posts of the two countries. He cried to no avail and went into a serious depression and never recovered. His colleagues put him to rest in Assab."

16. The forcible separation of parents from their children is one of the most distressing aspects to the deportations. In some cases, even breastfeeding mothers have been wrenched away from their babies. A study by UNICEF Eritrea found that 165 deportees contacted had been forced to leave a total of 291 children behind, including 9 under one year and 37 aged between one and five. Most were left with relatives and a few with neighbours, but 43 had simply been left on their own. In many other cases men have been separated from their wives.

17. Some of the deportees were told to sign powers of attorney to relatives. Usually this just amounted to writing a name on a piece of paper and handing it to a policeman; it has no legal force. Many of those relatives have subsequently been arrested and deported. Others have been told to sell the property immediately. In some cases, children have been ordered to sell off complex businesses worth hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. The security officers who have carried out these operations have simply sealed businesses without even taking an inventory, let alone producing any legal documents. Houses, cars and trucks, shops, hotels and restaurants, factories and farms, have in essence simply been confiscated. Farms have been left newly ploughed. Cattle have been abandoned wandering in the wilderness. A survey of 1,400 deportees estimated that this group alone had left behind wealth estimated at US$ 212 million.

18. We are thankful that many compassionate and law-abiding Ethiopian citizens, of all ethnicities, have performed small acts of kindness for the deportees on their long journeys, and to their family members left behind. Many Ethiopians are caring for distressed children whose parents have been snatched away; perhaps they came home from school to find their houses sealed and their parents gone, and only a sympathetic neighbour to take care of them.

19. Such humanity appears to be contrary to the intent of the Government of Ethiopia. Since May, it has engaged in a propaganda campaign of quite extraordinary venom directed against Eritrea and Eritreans. Every day, Ethiopians who listen to the radio or watch television or read the newspapers or attend public meetings where government officials are speaking will hear invective aimed at Eritreans. Eritreans are accused of being fascists and chauvinists, of being belligerent and spiteful, neo-colonialist, anti-people, etc.

20. The Ethiopian Government has broadcast many fabricated claims of Eritrean abuses. For example, the claim that seven Ethiopians were burned to death in Alla was clearly refuted by the BBC correspondent who visited the site and investigated for himself. Allegations such as "group rapes by Eritrean fighters", "the wanton shooting of Ethiopians who wanted to leave in Adi Quala" and "Sixty Ethiopians died of asphyxiation in Assab after being locked in a container" are quite untrue and are clearly designed to incite anti-Eritrean feeling among the Ethiopian populace. Perhaps the most extreme allegation from the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry is the claim that "the Eritrean authorities have been detaining thousands of Ethiopians in the Sawa, Asmara and Assab concentration camps without access to their families, the ICRC and journalists." This is pure fiction not even worthy of a rebuttal before this distinguished audience. I could go on and on, just as the Ethiopian media goes on and on, hammering in its message day after day. It is a sad reality that the most outrageous propaganda, repeated often enough, will break down the resistance of even the most sceptical and humane citizen. Violence of the tongue precedes violence of the gun.

21. The international community is free to come to Eritrea and investigate these allegations for themselves. We have already extended an invitation to the Commission on Human Rights which, I am happy to report, has been accepted. Do not judge Eritrea by my words alone; the facts are there for the world to see.

22. Needless to say, Ethiopia's hate campaign not only is in violation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but is also irresponsible since it does not take into consideration the future relations between our two peoples.

23. This is a campaign of hatred that has no precedent in Ethiopian history, even during the darkest days of the previous regime. In all civilized countries, inciting hatred on the basis of race, religion, nationality or ethnicity is a crime. When a Government itself incites national hatred, we can only fear for the worst.

24. The Government of Ethiopia has also rounded up more than 1,000 Eritreans and interned them in camps. The majority of these are civilians who were

previously fighters with EPLF or who formerly received military training in the Eritrean national service. Although they are civilians, the Ethiopian Government has described them as "prisoners of war". There are also 85 university students, whose studies at Addis Ababa University were abruptly terminated by their collective arrest and detention. Ethiopia has no legal basis for detaining these students. The correct course of action would have been to allow them to return to Eritrea. At first, these people were detained in Fiche camp and then they were moved to Blatien, a location in the south of Ethiopia without the knowledge of ICRC. The Geneva Conventions (Fourth Convention, articles 79 to 141) deal in great detail with conditions under which civilians may be interned and how camps should be administered. We fear that those provisions have been violated. First, most of the internees have been detained illegally in violation of human rights and humanitarian law. Secondly, we have reason to fear that the conditions in the camps do not fulfil the legal obligations on the Ethiopian Government, so that it may be justified to call these camps "concentration camps" rather than just "internment camps".

25. The international community and the United Nations are free to come to Eritrea to investigate the record of the Eritrean Government for themselves. We are committed to transparency and pursue an open-door policy. Unlike Ethiopia, Eritrea is actively cooperating on these matters with ICRC and the United Nations agencies in Eritrea as well as the diplomatic community.

26. The Government of Eritrea has not taken any illegal or abusive actions against Ethiopians residing in Eritrea. The Ethiopian chargé d'affaires in Asmara told the visiting delegation from OAU on 30 June that Eritrea held 57 Ethiopians in detention on suspicion of being a threat to the security of the State. He admitted that this was probably an exaggeration as they were being released as their cases were examined. Shortly beforehand, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister had accused Eritrea of imprisoning 600 Ethiopians and, as I have mentioned, the Foreign Ministry has also alleged that untold thousands are held in "concentration camps". Today, the reality is that we are holding just 17 Ethiopians on grounds of national security, having individually investigated them. ICRC has full access to them all.

27. Ethiopians who wish to stay in Eritrea are free to stay, and we are endeavouring to facilitate the departure of those who wish to leave through the offices of ICRC. Eighty Ethiopian teachers in Assab left freely for Djibouti with the assistance of the local administration, but on their arrival there the Ethiopian Government claimed they had been expelled. Forty-five Ethiopian students studying at the University of Asmara were permitted to remain, finish their studies and sit for their exams, and then return peacefully to Ethiopia. However, the Ethiopian Government has claimed that "the Eritrean forces have brutally expelled well over 5,000 Ethiopian citizens from Eritrea after depriving them of their property and subjecting many of them to beatings and torture". This is completely without any foundation in fact.

28. On 13 May, the Ethiopian Government decided unilaterally to reroute all its shipping away from the Eritrean port of Assab to Djibouti, and to close the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This action by the Government of Ethiopia had the entirely predictable result that Ethiopian port workers in Assab had no work to do and Ethiopian cargo in the port was stranded. The charge by the

Ethiopian Government that Eritrea has denied the right to work to Ethiopians in Assab and has confiscated Ethiopian cargo is therefore without foundation. United Nations agencies have confirmed that salaries are still being paid to Ethiopian employees in Assab, but that daily labourers are now without an income and need relief assistance.

29. On 26 June, the Eritrean National Assembly resolved:

> "In contrast to the inhuman policy of the Ethiopian Government, the Eritrean Government has not, and will not, take any hostile action against Ethiopians residing in the country. Their right to live and work in peace is guaranteed. If this right is infringed upon under any circumstances or by any institution they have full rights of redress."

I need hardly draw the contrast between this public appeal for lawfulness and the campaign of national hate seen daily in the Ethiopian media. But, I reiterate, we stand judged by our actions and not our words. Please come and see for yourself.

30. The Government of Eritrea was distressed by the deaths of civilians, including some children, in an air attack on Mekelle airbase on 5 June. The air raid was carried out at 3 p.m. in response to an air attack on Asmara airport launched from Mekelle airbase at 2.10 p.m. earlier that day, in which 34 Eritrean civilians were either killed or wounded. The Ethiopian claim that their air raid was in "retaliation" was false, as confirmed by diplomats and journalists. Their claim that the deaths of civilians was the result of a "premeditated attack" is also quite untrue. Our air force is small and newly formed, and we never expected to have to use it against our former friends and allies in Ethiopia. But when we were attacked by the Ethiopian air force, we responded by striking against the Ethiopian air force base which had been established at Mekelle airport. I repeat, we did not target civilians intentionally although unfortunately some were caught in the cross-fire. Otherwise, the result at Mekelle airport, with several aircraft destroyed on the ground, attests to the purely military nature of the mission of the Eritrean air force.

31. All States Members of the United Nations have undertaken definite legal obligations towards persons living in their territories by the simple act of signing the Charter of the United Nations. Among these obligations are the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as stated in the Charter of the United Nations, and elaborated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments. No State can claim derogation from the essential obligations entailed therein on grounds of a state of emergency. In this respect, it would be necessary to note that this Commission on 3 March 1995 adopted the Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, which specifically identifies the acts prohibited under article 3, paragraph 2. Moreover, having declared war on Eritrea, Ethiopia is also bound by the Geneva Conventions which specifically prohibit the forcible deportation of populations and even brand it as a "grave breach".

32. It is therefore the duty of the international community to act decisively when crimes are committed on such an alarming scale and in as distinctively an odious manner as in Ethiopia today. At the very least, it should express its disapprobation of the act and its sympathy with the victims. In this regard, we greatly appreciate the objective and timely statement by Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressing her profound concern at the violations of the Ethiopian Government.

33. The crime committed by the Government of Ethiopia against Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean origin and Eritrean residents in Ethiopia outrages the conscience of mankind and endangers the foundations of freedom and justice as well as peace, stability and security in the region. It is for this reason that the Eritrean delegation requests this Commission to pass a resolution which would:

(1) Deplore the Ethiopian Government's gross violation of the human rights of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean descent residing in Ethiopia;

(2) Call for the immediate cessation of all mass detention and expulsion of Eritreans; demand the immediate release of all Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin who have been unlawfully detained in prisons and internment camps; and call for the protection of the lives, rights and properties of Eritrean and Ethiopian-Eritrean deportees and those still residing in Ethiopia, including their right to leave the country if they so desire;

(3) Call for the immediate end of propaganda aimed at inciting racial hatred against Eritreans and instead call for the Ethiopian Government to make public statements calling for calmness and respect for Eritreans resident in Ethiopia and Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean origin;

(4) Call for the reunification of separated Eritrean families, including arrangement of early and safe transport;

(5) Call for the immediate return of confiscated property to Eritrean and Ethiopian-Eritrean deportees and the payment of compensation for any loss of property or income;

(6) Appoint, as a matter of urgency, a fact-finding mission which would conduct an on-site investigation of the human rights conditions of Eritreans in Ethiopia, to supplement the mission already agreed for Eritrea;

(7) Call upon the Government of Ethiopia to cooperate fully with the fact-finding mission by permitting it full and free access to establish contact with Eritreans in its territory;

(8) In recognition that war is the greatest cause of human rights violations, call for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the peaceful resolution of the border conflict.

34. I wish I could give a rational explanation for the actions of the Ethiopian Government over the last three months. Just 90 days ago, the mass expulsion of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin was literally unthinkable. We pray that there is no more madness to come from those responsible for the protection of Ethiopian citizens and residents of whatever origin.

35. Eritrea has nothing to seek except the promotion of the lasting interests of the peoples of the two countries and the development of personal and cultural, socio-economic and political relations between them which will foster the profit and advantage of both and which shall not interfere with the peace and rights of either.

36. The Eritrean delegation thus solemnly pledges that the Government of Eritrea shall continue to scrupulously observe the human rights of Ethiopians living in Eritrea, fully cooperate with this Commission or any other international organization which wishes to conduct unrestricted investigation of the conditions of Ethiopians residing in Eritrea and shall remain committed to the truth, verifiable by impartial observers, and totally dedicated to the well-being and mutually beneficial future of the peoples of both countries.

37. It also reaffirms its opposition to any threats or use of force and any measures of political and economic coercion which attempt to violate the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and security of any State.

38. In the interest of peace and security and the welfare of their populations, the delegation of the State of Eritrea invites the delegation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to join it in this earnest commitment to human rights and its commitment to, and search for, peace by solemnly making a similar pledge before this Commission.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1180 (1998) of 29 June 1998, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to submit a report by 7 August 1998 with recommendations regarding the United Nations involvement in Angola, taking into account the safety and freedom of movement of personnel of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) and the status of the peace process. It covers developments since my last report of 17 June 1998 (S/1998/524).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. After two months of frustrating delays, the Angolan Government and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) held high-level consultations in Andulo on 18 and 19 June 1998, which led to a number of understandings, including an agreement to return all government authorities and UNITA party functionaries to the areas they had recently left. However, at the meeting, UNITA again failed to set specific dates for the extension of state administration to its four strongholds of Andulo, Bailundo, Mungo and N'Harea, although four joint Government/UNITA technical groups visited the areas on 19 June and completed the necessary preparatory work.

3. Shortly before his tragic death, my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, held intensive consultations with President José Eduardo dos Santos and the UNITA leader, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, in order to ensure the timely extension of state administration to these four localities and the earliest completion of the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex). On 22 June 1998, Mr. Beye met in Andulo with Mr. Savimbi, who reiterated his earlier promise to proceed with normalization before 30 June. Accordingly, and with the consent of the Government of Angola, on 24 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 1176 (1998), by which it postponed, until 1 July 1998, the entry into force of the additional measures stipulated in resolution 1173 (1998), dated 12 June 1998.

4. On 26 June 1998, Mr. Beye left Luanda to consult with several leaders of the region, in yet another effort to move the Angolan peace process forward. After holding consultations with the Presidents of Gabon and Togo, his aircraft crashed 16 kilometres north-east of Abidjan airport, while making an approach to land. All eight people on board, including Mr. Beye, five MONUA staff and two pilots, tragically lost their lives in the accident. The death of Mr. Beye occurred at a critical phase in the peace process. I immediately asked the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Bernard Miyet, to travel to Angola to reaffirm the United Nations commitment to the peace process. Mr. Miyet, who visited Angola from 29 June to 3 July, held intensive consultations with all parties concerned, including the Angolan Prime Minister, Mr. Van Dunem, and Mr. Savimbi. I designated the MONUA Force Commander, Major-General Seth Kofi Obeng, Officer-in-Charge of the Mission and temporarily assigned my Representative and Regional Humanitarian Adviser to the Great Lakes, Mr. Berhanu Dinka, as Senior Political Adviser to MONUA. I have also maintained active contacts with the parties, both in writing and through telephone conversations, urging them to exercise restraint and to take concrete steps to avoid the further deterioration of the situation in the country.

5. At the request of Mr. Savimbi, Major-General Obeng travelled to Andulo on 8 July to hold discussions on ways and means to stabilize the security situation and to resume the extension of state administration, particularly in the four strategic localities. The UNITA leader expressed his readiness to implement the measures agreed upon on 18 and 19 June, and suggested that MONUA should reopen a number of its team sites to assist in re-establishing cooperation between the two parties on the ground. Mr. Savimbi also indicated that strict instructions had been given to all UNITA members to ensure the safety of all international personnel. Major-General Obeng offered to facilitate discussions on this and other issues within the framework of the Joint Commission, and requested UNITA urgently to send back to Luanda the head of its delegation, who had regrettably been absent from the capital for almost two months. Furthermore, the absence of senior UNITA representatives from the recently inaugurated party headquarters at Luanda has had a negative impact on the peace process.

6. Subsequently, UNITA was repeatedly asked by the Joint Commission to establish dates for the transfer of the four localities to the Government's control. However, in response, it linked any consideration of such dates to the re-establishment of its party structures where, it claimed, they had been dismantled. On 24 July 1998, MONUA, in consultation with the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), presented to the parties a new timetable aimed at facilitating the extension of state administration to UNITA strongholds by 13 August 1998. However, despite strenuous efforts by MONUA and the observers to the peace process, no agreement could be reached on that plan.

7. The reporting period has been marked by the absence of any sustained dialogue between the Government and UNITA, as well as by the intensification of hostile propaganda, which has further deepened the mutual mistrust. UNITA claimed that, from April to June 1998, the Angolan National Police (ANP) had killed 263 of UNITA members and sympathizers. It also asserted that the Government was attempting to dismantle its party, and had so far eliminated its structures in 212 out of the 272 localities where state administration had been

extended. For its part, the Government accused UNITA of trying to make the country ungovernable by reoccupying over 70 localities, which were earlier transferred to the Government's authority, and by killing hundreds of government functionaries and civilians and displacing tens of thousands of people.

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III. MILITARY AND SECURITY ASPECTS

9. The military and security situation in the country has further deteriorated and the risks of a resumption of full-scale hostilities have increased significantly. UNITA forces have continued to threaten the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the national police in Lunda Sul, Lunda Norte, Moxico, Uige and Cuanza Norte Provinces. Evidently, UNITA has maintained a significant military capability, despite its past declarations on the demilitarization of its forces. On many occasions, UNITA "residual" troops have been identified as being responsible for attacks on villages and most recently towns, as well as ambushes on major roads. There have also been incidents of selective killing and kidnapping in order to intimidate the population and dissuade it from cooperating with government authorities.

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11. On the other hand, it is reported that FAA troops have started laying protective minefields around their positions in the Huambo, Saurimo and Luena regions. Furthermore, the Government has mobilized FAA and has embarked on forced conscription. Its troops are also demonstrating force by carrying out military training and live firing practices around population centres. At the same time, acts of violence perpetuated against UNITA supporters by the ANP and FAA have increased and many UNITA members have left government-controlled areas because of this harassment. Deployment of FAA and ANP forces has also caused the temporary closure of several airports and severely curtailed free movement of people.

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14. The civilian police (CIVPOL) observers continue to monitor ANP activities in an attempt to ensure its neutrality, especially in the areas where Government control has been extended. They also monitor security arrangements for the UNITA leaders in Luanda, as well as the incorporation of Mr. Savimbi's security detachment into ANP. Of the 400 personnel officially belonging to that detachment, 117 were formally inducted into ANP in Andulo on 27 June 1998. The remaining personnel, who are reportedly deployed outside Andulo, were to be incorporated later. CIVPOL observers also conducted frequent patrols and visits to prisons and other detention centres and, together with human rights observers (see sect. V below), monitored the human rights situation.

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17. The human rights situation is lamentable. It is marked by extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention and severely restricted freedom of movement. The abuses have contributed to spreading fear among the population and have led to an increase in the number of internally displaced persons and of villages abandoned because of real or possible attacks. The high toll of casualties inflicted by UNITA residual forces and unidentified armed elements included women and children, Sobas (traditional leaders), local Government administrators and their families, as well as ANP officers.

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19. The present human rights situation underlines the need to continue to strengthen human rights activities, which can contribute to the promotion of confidence-building in the country by strengthening institutions necessary for post-conflict reconstruction, while also addressing allegations of individual human rights violations. Despite many difficulties and hesitations, there appears to be a willingness in Luanda and provincial capitals, as well as adequate opportunities, to strengthen the rule of law. This important activity will obviously require considerable assistance from the international community.

VI. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

A. Relief and rehabilitation

20. The worsening security conditions in Angola have had a severe impact on the humanitarian situation.

21. Since March 1998, almost 120,000 persons have been confirmed as being internally displaced. However, unconfirmed reports of new, larger numbers of internally displaced cannot be verified owing to the lack of safe access. The total of internally displaced in Angola is estimated at a staggering 1.3 million persons, which represents over 10 per cent of the country's population. In addition, thousands of Angolans have fled the country for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An influx of Angolan refugees has also been reported in Zambia and Namibia.

22. The humanitarian community's access to affected populations has been severely impeded by the spreading crisis and the attacks on its members in some areas of the country. Representatives of United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations in the field have been advised to restrict their movements and to remain mostly in provincial capitals. That has led to a substantial decrease in the number of missions to assess and monitor the humanitarian situation and to distribute relief assistance. Given those constraints, the humanitarian agencies can now provide food assistance to only 50 per cent of the newly displaced. Moreover, the withdrawal of some of MONUA's formed military units that previously provided escorts to humanitarian missions has curtailed many regular activities in the provinces.

23. A recent outbreak of meningitis in some regions, which has also affected the internally displaced population, is an additional concern of the humanitarian community, which has to obtain sufficient medical supplies and then find secure routes to access the affected populations.

24. It appears that the erosion of confidence in the peace process has also adversely affected donors' response to the 1998 Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal. So far, United Nations agencies have received only 36.7 per cent of the total of $91,200,142 requested for this year. The lack of sufficient funding threatens the continuation of some of the important programmes conducted by the United Nations agencies and the International Organization for Migration. Food aid, basic health services, essential relief and survival items are in short supply. The newly displaced population further increases the pressures on the already stretched resources of the humanitarian community.

25. As a result of the prevailing conditions, the much anticipated transition from relief-oriented programmes to recovery and rehabilitation programmes has to be postponed. It is evident that, without a substantial improvement in the security environment, more civilians will be affected by the violence and that Angola's hope to rapidly resume developmental activities will have been dashed.

B. Demobilization and reintegration

26. The demobilization of approximately 6,000 FAA military war-disabled personnel has not begun, pending provision by the Government of the necessary information about their locations and the availability of sufficient funds. The funding requirements for this important project is estimated at US$ 2.5 million.

27. As of July 1998, almost 34,000 out of 49,851 formally demobilized soldiers were registered with the National Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-combatants and the counselling and referral services. Approximately 3,000 demobilized ex-combatants participated in quick impact projects and another 2,000 former soldiers were associated with vocational training programmes. At the same time, the implementation of the reintegration programme has been severely affected by the overall security situation in their country. Furthermore, the recently conducted outreach programme to rural areas has also been restricted to the accessible provinces. In the meantime, an independent evaluation of the reintegration programme, in which the Government participated, recommended that the mandate of the programme be extended to the

soldiers demobilized during the 1991-1992 peace process; and that a regional, rather than provincial, approach be introduced. It was also recommended that the overall time-frame be extended until the end of 1999 and the programme be implemented only in the areas where security conditions permit. Immediate funding requirements for this project amount to US$ 6 million.

C. Demining

28. Severe financial constraints, as well as the security situation, continued to hamper the implementation of the demining programmes in Angola. The lack of sufficient and timely donor contributions to the Special Trust Fund has resulted in the cessation of the training of new national demining teams and in the substantive reduction of the operational capacity of the seven existing brigades of deminers. These factors have led to the suspension of demining activities in some locations, which was compounded by shortages of transportation. The equipment currently used by the Angolan demining programme was originally purchased by the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III for the establishment of a national demining capacity. The transfer of this equipment from MONUA to the demining programme operating under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) would facilitate the continuation of the programme. Accordingly, I intend to recommend to the General Assembly the donation of the necessary equipment to the United Nations Office for Project Services demining programme in Angola as part of the downsizing of MONUA. In consultation and agreement with the Government, UNDP intends to carry out a comprehensive review of the mine action programme in Angola during August and September 1998. In the meantime, immediate funding of the programme requirements for 1998 amount to US$ 3.4 million.

VII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

29. The macroeconomic problems facing the Angolan economy are marked by increasing inflation, rapidly fluctuating foreign exchange rates and the Government's expenditure which is focused mainly on the payment of wages. Foreign currency exchange for normal business transactions has not been available through the national banks and new investment was made only in the oil sector. Economic instability has been compounded by a persistent budget deficit. Despite the efforts to contain the high inflation rates, prices of goods and services remain very high for the average consumer and the country once again appeared to be on the threshold of hyperinflation. Foreign exchange rates on the parallel market have recently escalated from 400,000 new kwanzas (NKz) to 580,000 NKz to one United States dollar, which represents nearly twice the official exchange rate. Because of Angola's heavy dependence on imported goods, market prices of these items have risen simultaneously with the current rates of exchange on the parallel market, thus further fuelling inflation.

30. Angola's economic difficulties have recently been exacerbated by the low price of oil on the world market. The Government has, therefore, been compelled to revise downwards its projections about the growth of the economy and has had to make serious adjustments to the current budget. This notwithstanding, the budget deficit is likely to increase considerably.

31. In the meantime, the Government intends to pursue discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in August 1998, concerning a possible IMF-monitored structural adjustment programme. Partly because of the delays in the peace process, support provided to the implementation of the National Community Rehabilitation Programme has fallen far short of the level of pledges made at the 1995 Round Table Conference held at Brussels.

32. The support of socio-economic recovery continues to be one of the main objectives and areas of activities of the United Nations agencies and programmes. UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund, the World Food Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund all participate in these activities according to their mandates and means. The current security situation in the country has gravely hampered the proper implementation of the long-term United Nations programmes, as well as the activities of international non-governmental organizations and bilateral donors.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

33. By its resolution 52/8 C of 26 June 1998, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of US$ 43.6 million gross, equivalent to US$ 10.9 million gross per month, for the operation of MONUA for the period from 1 July to 31 October 1998. The assessment of these amounts is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission beyond 15 August 1998. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MONUA, as recommended in paragraph 39 below, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 15 September 1998 would be met from the amounts appropriated by the General Assembly in resolution 52/8 C.

34. As at 31 July 1998, unpaid assessed contributions to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)/MONUA special account amounted to US$ 87 million. The total of outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1.5 billion.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

35. Regrettably, since my last report, there has been no improvement in the already deplorable situation in Angola. The country continues to drift towards full-fledged hostilities, despite the renewed efforts of the international community to avoid a precipitous turn of events.

36. I strongly urge the Government and UNITA to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any steps which would further exacerbate the present situation, since this may destroy the difficult gains achieved in the peace process. I am most disturbed by the failure of UNITA to demobilize fully its forces and to facilitate the extension of state administration throughout the country, requirements which are the pillars of the Lusaka Protocol. These crucial obligations, as well as other major undertakings, must be fulfilled without further delay. UNITA also must stop its attacks against government-

controlled areas and other attempts to destabilize the country. Similarly, ANP must refrain from practices inconsistent with its status as defined under the Lusaka Protocol.

37. I call on the Government and, in particular, UNITA to renew their efforts towards national reconciliation, to cease the exchange of threats and war rhetoric and to initiate immediately confidence-building measures, both at the national and local levels. These measures should include the expeditious reactivation of the joint mechanisms in the provinces. Needless to say, practical steps should also be taken to disengage the military forces on the ground, under effective MONUA verification.

38. For the peace process to be restored, all these steps require urgent implementation. However, genuine and meaningful dialogue will only be possible when the high-level UNITA representatives return to Luanda and participate constructively in the work of the Joint Commission. As soon as the above steps are carried out and the security situation improves, MONUA will be prepared to re-establish its presence in key locations throughout the country in order to facilitate cooperation and promote confidence. Alternatively, the United Nations will be compelled to reconsider its deployment on the ground.

39. In the meantime, I reaffirm the willingness of the United Nations to continue to help the Angolan people, provided there is an unequivocal commitment of the Government and UNITA to the peaceful resolution of the crisis on the basis of the Lusaka Protocol. Having the above in mind, I decided to send Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi to Angola as my Special Envoy. He will assess the various aspects of the situation in the country and advise me on the possible course of action. Mr. Brahimi, who arrived at Luanda on 31 July 1998, was received by President dos Santos on 3 August and by Mr. Savimbi in Andulo the following day. My Special Envoy will also consult with the Governments of neighbouring countries. He is expected to complete his assessment mission in approximately 10 days, after which I will be in a better position to make recommendations about the future role of the United Nations in Angola. In the meantime, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MONUA for one month, that is, until 15 September 1998.

40. In conclusion, I would like, once again, to pay tribute to the ultimate sacrifice of Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, the five MONUA staff and the two pilots who perished in the aircraft accident on 26 June. The untimely death of the MONUA colleagues represents an incalculable loss for their families, for the international community and for the cause of peace. The best way to honour Mr. Beye, in memory, therefore, would be for the Government and, in particular, UNITA to work resolutely towards the genuine peace and national reconciliation, which the people of Angola deserve so much.



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7 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1180 (1998) of 29 June 1998, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to submit a report by 7 August 1998 with recommendations regarding the United Nations involvement in Angola, taking into account the safety and freedom of movement of personnel of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) and the status of the peace process. It covers developments since my last report of 17 June 1998 (S/1998/524).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. After two months of frustrating delays, the Angolan Government and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) held high-level consultations in Andulo on 18 and 19 June 1998, which led to a number of understandings, including an agreement to return all government authorities and UNITA party functionaries to the areas they had recently left. However, at the meeting, UNITA again failed to set specific dates for the extension of state administration to its four strongholds of Andulo, Bailundo, Mungo and N'Harea, although four joint Government/UNITA technical groups visited the areas on 19 June and completed the necessary preparatory work.

3. Shortly before his tragic death, my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, held intensive consultations with President José Eduardo dos Santos and the UNITA leader, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, in order to ensure the timely extension of state administration to these four localities and the earliest completion of the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex). On 22 June 1998, Mr. Beye met in Andulo with Mr. Savimbi, who reiterated his earlier promise to proceed with normalization before 30 June. Accordingly, and with the consent of the Government of Angola, on 24 June, the Security Council adcpted resolution 1176 (1998), by which it postponed, until

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

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1 July 1998, the entry into force of the additional measures stipulated in resolution 1173 (1998), dated 12 June 1998.

4. On 26 June 1998, Mr. Beye left Luanda to consult with several leaders of the region, in yet another effort to move the Angolan peace process forward. After holding consultations with the Presidents of Gabon and Togo, his aircraft crashed 16 kilometres north-east of Abidjan airport, while making an approach to land. All eight people on board, including Mr. Beye, five MONUA staff and two pilots, tragically lost their lives in the accident. The death of Mr. Beye occurred at a critical phase in the peace process. I immediately asked the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Bernard Miyet, to travel to Angola to reaffirm the United Nations commitment to the peace process. Mr. Miyet, who visited Angola from 29 June to 3 July, held intensive consultations with all parties concerned, including the Angolan Prime Minister, Mr. Van Dunem, and Mr. Savimbi. I designated the MONUA Force Commander, Major-General Seth Kofi Obeng, Officer-in-Charge of the Mission and temporarily assigned my Representative and Regional Humanitarian Adviser to the Great Lakes, Mr. Berhanu Dinka, as Senior Political Adviser to MONUA. I have also maintained active contacts with the parties, both in writing and through telephone conversations, urging them to exercise restraint and to take concrete steps to avoid the further deterioration of the situation in the country.

5. At the request of Mr. Savimbi, Major-General Obeng travelled to Andulo on 8 July to hold discussions on ways and means to stabilize the security situation and to resume the extension of state administration, particularly in the four strategic localities. The UNITA leader expressed his readiness to implement the measures agreed upon on 18 and 19 June, and suggested that MONUA should reopen a number of its team sites to assist in re-establishing cooperation between the two parties on the ground. Mr. Savimbi also indicated that strict instructions had been given to all UNITA members to ensure the safety of all international personnel. Major-General Obeng offered to facilitate discussions on this and other issues within the framework of the Joint Commission, and requested UNITA urgently to send back to Luanda the head of its delegation, who had regrettably been absent from the capital for almost two months. Furthermore, the absence of senior UNITA representatives from the recently inaugurated party headquarters at Luanda has had a negative impact on the peace process.

6. Subsequently, UNITA was repeatedly asked by the Joint Commission to establish dates for the transfer of the four localities to the Government's control. However, in response, it linked any consideration of such dates to the re-establishment of its party structures where, it claimed, they had been dismantled. On 24 July 1998, MONUA, in consultation with the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), presented to the parties a new timetable aimed at facilitating the extension of state administration to UNITA strongholds by 13 August 1998. However, despite strenuous efforts by MONUA and the observers to the peace process, no agreement could be reached on that plan.

7. The reporting period has been marked by the absence of any sustained dialogue between the Government and UNITA, as well as by the intensification of hostile propaganda, which has further deepened the mutual mistrust. UNITA claimed that, from April to June 1998, the Angolan National Police (ANP) had

killed 263 of UNITA members and sympathizers. It also asserted that the Government was attempting to dismantle its party, and had so far eliminated its structures in 212 out of the 272 localities where state administration had been extended. For its part, the Government accused UNITA of trying to make the country ungovernable by reoccupying over 70 localities, which were earlier transferred to the Government's authority, and by killing hundreds of government functionaries and civilians and displacing tens of thousands of people.

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B. Demobilization and reintegration

26. The demobilization of approximately 6,000 FAA military war-disabled personnel has not begun, pending provision by the Government of the necessary information about their locations and the availability of sufficient funds. The funding requirements for this important project is estimated at US$ 2.5 million.

27. As of July 1998, almost 34,000 out of 49,851 formally demobilized soldiers were registered with the National Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-combatants and the counselling and referral services. Approximately 3,000 demobilized ex-combatants participated in quick impact projects and another 2,000 former soldiers were associated with vocational training programmes. At the same time, the implementation of the reintegration programme has been severely affected by the overall security situation in their

country. Furthermore, the recently conducted outreach programme to rural areas has also been restricted to the accessible provinces. In the meantime, an independent evaluation of the reintegration programme, in which the Government participated, recommended that the mandate of the programme be extended to the soldiers demobilized during the 1991-1992 peace process; and that a regional, rather than provincial, approach be introduced. It was also recommended that the overall time-frame be extended until the end of 1999 and the programme be implemented only in the areas where security conditions permit. Immediate funding requirements for this project amount to US$ 6 million.

C. Demining

28. Severe financial constraints, as well as the security situation, continued to hamper the implementation of the demining programmes in Angola. The lack of sufficient and timely donor contributions to the Special Trust Fund has resulted in the cessation of the training of new national demining teams and in the substantive reduction of the operational capacity of the seven existing brigades of deminers. These factors have led to the suspension of demining activities in some locations, which was compounded by shortages of transportation. The equipment currently used by the Angolan demining programme was originally purchased by the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III for the establishment of a national demining capacity. The transfer of this equipment from MONUA to the demining programme operating under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) would facilitate the continuation of the programme. Accordingly, I intend to recommend to the General Assembly the donation of the necessary equipment to the United Nations Office for Project Services demining programme in Angola as part of the downsizing of MONUA. In consultation and agreement with the Government, UNDP intends to carry out a comprehensive review of the mine action programme in Angola during August and September 1998. In the meantime, immediate funding of the programme requirements for 1998 amount to US$ 3.4 million.

VII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

29. The macroeconomic problems facing the Angolan economy are marked by increasing inflation, rapidly fluctuating foreign exchange rates and the Government's expenditure which is focused mainly on the payment of wages. Foreign currency exchange for normal business transactions has not been available through the national banks and new investment was made only in the oil sector. Economic instability has been compounded by a persistent budget deficit. Despite the efforts to contain the high inflation rates, prices of goods and services remain very high for the average consumer and the country once again appeared to be on the threshold of hyperinflation. Foreign exchange rates on the parallel market have recently escalated from 400,000 new kwanzas (NKz) to 580,000 NKz to one United States dollar, which represents nearly twice the official exchange rate. Because of Angola's heavy dependence on imported goods, market prices of these items have risen simultaneously with the current rates of exchange on the parallel market, thus further fuelling inflation.

30. Angola's economic difficulties have recently been exacerbated by the low price of oil on the world market. The Government has, therefore, been compelled to revise downwards its projections about the growth of the economy and has had to make serious adjustments to the current budget. This notwithstanding, the budget deficit is likely to increase considerably.

31. In the meantime, the Government intends to pursue discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in August 1998, concerning a possible IMF-monitored structural adjustment programme. Partly because of the delays in the peace process, support provided to the implementation of the National Community Rehabilitation Programme has fallen far short of the level of pledges made at the 1995 Round Table Conference held at Brussels.

32. The support of socio-economic recovery continues to be one of the main objectives and areas of activities of the United Nations agencies and programmes. UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund, the World Food Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund all participate in these activities according to their mandates and means. The current security situation in the country has gravely hampered the proper implementation of the long-term United Nations programmes, as well as the activities of international non-governmental organizations and bilateral donors.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

33. By its resolution 52/8 C of 26 June 1998, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of US$ 43.6 million gross, equivalent to US$ 10.9 million gross per month, for the operation of MONUA for the period from 1 July to 31 October 1998. The assessment of these amounts is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission beyond 15 August 1998. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MONUA, as recommended in paragraph 39 below, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 15 September 1998 would be met from the amounts appropriated by the General Assembly in resolution 52/8 C.

34. As at 31 July 1998, unpaid assessed contributions to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)/MONUA special account amounted to US$ 87 million. The total of outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1.5 billion.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

35. Regrettably, since my last report, there has been no improvement in the already deplorable situation in Angola. The country continues to drift towards full-fledged hostilities, despite the renewed efforts of the international community to avoid a precipitous turn of events.

36. I strongly urge the Government and UNITA to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any steps which would further exacerbate the present

situation, since this may destroy the difficult gains achieved in the peace process. I am most disturbed by the failure of UNITA to demobilize fully its forces and to facilitate the extension of state administration throughout the country, requirements which are the pillars of the Lusaka Protocol. These crucial obligations, as well as other major undertakings, must be fulfilled without further delay. UNITA also must stop its attacks against government-controlled areas and other attempts to destabilize the country. Similarly, ANP must refrain from practices inconsistent with its status as defined under the Lusaka Protocol.

37. I call on the Government and, in particular, UNITA to renew their efforts towards national reconciliation, to cease the exchange of threats and war rhetoric and to initiate immediately confidence-building measures, both at the national and local levels. These measures should include the expeditious reactivation of the joint mechanisms in the provinces. Needless to say, practical steps should also be taken to disengage the military forces on the ground, under effective MONUA verification.

38. For the peace process to be restored, all these steps require urgent implementation. However, genuine and meaningful dialogue will only be possible when the high-level UNITA representatives return to Luanda and participate constructively in the work of the Joint Commission. As soon as the above steps are carried out and the security situation improves, MONUA will be prepared to re-establish its presence in key locations throughout the country in order to facilitate cooperation and promote confidence. Alternatively, the United Nations will be compelled to reconsider its deployment on the ground.

39. In the meantime, I reaffirm the willingness of the United Nations to continue to help the Angolan people, provided there is an unequivocal commitment of the Government and UNITA to the peaceful resolution of the crisis on the basis of the Lusaka Protocol. Having the above in mind, I decided to send Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi to Angola as my Special Envoy. He will assess the various aspects of the situation in the country and advise me on the possible course of action. Mr. Brahimi, who arrived at Luanda on 31 July 1998, was received by President dos Santos on 3 August and by Mr. Savimbi in Andulo the following day. My Special Envoy will also consult with the Governments of neighbouring countries. He is expected to complete his assessment mission in approximately 10 days, after which I will be in a better position to make recommendations about the future role of the United Nations in Angola. In the meantime, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MONUA for one month, that is, until 15 September 1998.

40. In conclusion, I would like, once again, to pay tribute to the ultimate sacrifice of Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, the five MONUA staff and the two pilots who perished in the aircraft accident on 26 June. The untimely death of the MONUA colleagues represents an incalculable loss for their families, for the international community and for the cause of peace. The best way to honour Mr. Beye, in memory, therefore, would be for the Government and, in particular, UNITA to work resolutely towards the genuine peace and national reconciliation, which the people of Angola deserve so much.

Annex

The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola: contributions as at 4 August 1998

	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Grand total
Argentina	-	20	-	-	20
Bangladesh	3	18	1	-	22
Brazil	4	17	2	-	23
Bulgaria	3	20	-	-	23
Congo	2	-	-	-	2
Egypt	3	19	-	-	22
France	3	-	-	-	3
Gambia	-	4	-	-	4
Ghana	3	6	-	-	9
Guinea-Bissau	2	4	-	-	6
Hungary	3	8	-	-	11
India	5	17	8	138	168
Jordan	3	27	-	-	30
Kenya	3	6	-	-	9
Malaysia	4	25	-	-	29
Mali	3	24	-	-	27
Namibia	-	-	2	138	140
New Zealand	3	-	-	-	3
Nigeria	4	21	-	-	25
Norway	3	-	-	-	3
Pakistan	5	-	1[b]	-	6
Poland	4	-	-	-	4
Portugal	4	47	-	80	131
Romania	-	-	4	138	142
Russian Federation	3	-	3	105	111
Senegal	4	-	-	-	4

	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Grand total
Slovakia	3	-	-	-	3
Spain	-	15	-	-	15
Sweden	3	20	-	-	23
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Ukraine	3	5	1	-	9
Uruguay	3	31	3	-	37
Zambia	3	23	8	-	34
Zimbabwe	3	22	4	-	29
TOTAL	92	402	37	599	1 130

[a] Including Military Police.

[b] A military specialist in the Demining School.



Map No. 4016 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS
August 1998

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UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/53/216
S/1998/724
6 August 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Items 20 (c) and 45 of
the provisional agenda*
STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: EMERGENCY INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR PEACE, NORMALCY AND RECONSTRUCTION OF WAR-STRICKEN AFGHANISTAN
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 6 August 1998 from the representatives of the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement on the outcome of the Russian-Uzbek talks held in Tashkent on 4 August 1998 regarding the situation in Afghanistan.

We should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the fifty-third session of the General Assembly, under items 20 (c) and 45 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yuriy FEDOTOV
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of
the Russian Federation to
the United Nations

(Signed) Alisher VOHIDOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
the Republic of Uzbekistan
to the United Nations

* A/53/150.

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ANNEX

Statement on the outcome of the Russian-Uzbek talks held in Tashkent on 4 August 1998

On 4 August 1998, Russian-Uzbek talks were held in Tashkent with the participation of General A. Kvashnin, First Deputy Minister for Defence, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Mr. B. Pastukhov, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and officials from other ministries concerned.

On the Uzbek side, Mr. K. Tursunov, Minister for Defence, Mr. A. Kamilov, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and officials from the relevant ministries took part in the talks.

A wide-ranging exchange of views was held in a spirit of openness, as is traditional, and of mutual concern for the strengthening of peace and stability in the Central Asian region, concerning the worsening situation in northern Afghanistan, where the Taliban movement, with massive support from outside, has unleashed a new offensive in an attempt to resolve the Afghan problem by force of arms.

All the efforts undertaken by the international community, under the auspices of the United Nations, to achieve a political settlement in Afghanistan, may be brought to naught. The determination of the Afghan people to preserve national integrity and harmony and resolve the country's internal problems by peaceful means has been openly disregarded.

The Russian Federation and Uzbekistan are deeply concerned about the escalation of bloodshed on Afghan soil. The Taliban movement must stop military actions immediately.

In the belief that only the Afghans themselves can determine the fate of their homeland, and, without external interference, put an end to the civil war which has lasted for so many years, the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan appeal to all the forces involved in the armed conflict to find peaceful ways of settling all the problems and disagreements.

The Russian and Uzbek representatives are prepared to meet representatives of the opposing Afghan forces immediately in order to prevent a further escalation of military actions in northern Afghanistan and promote the early defusing of the Afghan crisis.

As a result of the exchange of views on the current situation in Afghanistan, which may lead to a direct threat to the national interests and security of the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan, and also other Central Asian States of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the parties reserve the right to take all necessary measures to strengthen the security of their external borders in accordance with the Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1998/725
6 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF RWANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that since the start of the widespread army rebellion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Government of Rwanda has been the subject of totally false and misleading allegations about its involvement in the rebellion.

In this regard, and on behalf of the Government of Rwanda, I would like to put on record that the Rwandan Government has absolutely nothing to do with the internal rebellion of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These allegations are baseless and they lack any credibility. What is happening in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a purely internal matter, which the authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are trying to externalize by looking for scapegoats, instead of finding appropriate ways of dealing with a rebellion that has spread quickly across the entire country.

The crumbling of the Cabinet of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as exemplified by the recent resignations of a number of Ministers and high ranking civil servants, coupled with the country-wide support for the rebellion, cannot be attributed in any way to the Rwandan Government. The authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have also accused Rwandan troops of hijacking a civilian aircraft from the Goma airport in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and flying it to the military barracks of the Congolese army in the south-western town of Moanda, near the Atlantic Ocean. We would like to deny these allegations in the most categorical terms. They are untrue and incredible. If this were to be the case, why would the Rwandan troops take the aircraft from one point in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to another point in the same country rather than taking it to Rwanda?

Meanwhile, I would like to clarify that, indeed, there are Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese citizens in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in other parts of the country. These people are Congolese citizens, even if they happen to speak the same language as the one spoken in Rwanda. It is not the first time that, whenever political problems have arisen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in which Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese were involved together with other concerned Congolese, the Rwandan Government

has been blamed wrongly. We hope that the Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities and others will not continue to be confused about this situation.

The Government of Rwanda would like to reiterate that the current problems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are simply internal and that Rwanda is not involved in any way. Peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is in the interests of Rwanda and the rest of the African countries. This is why it is important for the Security Council to urge the belligerents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to find a peaceful solution to their internal problem rather than being misled by the authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo into believing that there has been an external aggression.

The Rwandan Government wishes to reaffirm its respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its readiness to assist in initiatives to promote peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region.

I would kindly request you to circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gideon KAYINAMURA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Rwanda to the United Nations

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/726
7 August 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 7 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter dated 7 August 1998, addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister, describing a new example of the deliberate delaying tactics used by the United Nations Special Commission to keep the disarmament files open and thereby prevent the implementation of paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex

Letter dated 7 August 1998 from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

In the letter which I sent to you on 5 August 1998, I referred to the delaying tactics used by the United Nations Special Commission to keep the disarmament files open and thereby prevent the implementation of paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Today I should like to inform you of a new example which confirms this attitude. On 5 August 1998, the Iraqi side received a letter (annexed) from the leader of inspection team 242, the United States national Mr. John Larrabee, in which he requests samples of destroyed materials which had previously been used for the indigenous production of engines, so as to have them analysed in laboratories outside Iraq. I should like to remind you that during the visit of the inspection team in question (from 22 July to 2 August 1998), detailed discussions took place in the presence of international experts, during which there was a detailed review of the situation with regard to the indigenous production of engines, the level of expertise achieved in that respect, the quality of indigenous production, and all aspects of production and assembly, and also the static and dynamic experiments carried out.

During this period, the components which had been destroyed (the major components and the secondary parts and components) were weighed and the material balance was established. The international experts of team 242 were thus able to ascertain the truth of the Iraqi declarations and the falsity of the information which the Special Commission had provided to the Security Council on 3 June 1998. It was clear to the experts that the Iraqi side had not produced operational engines. The indigenous production of engines was at the experimental stage (research-development), as Mr. John Larrabee himself recognized before leaving Iraq.

The analysis of the items in question by laboratories, as requested by Mr. Larrabee, is not justified from a technical point of view. It is clear that the real purpose of this request is to drag out this matter under the pretext of continuing the investigation.

It is regrettable that the Iraqi side received this letter after the end of the high-level discussions held with Mr. Butler and after everything that was said to him during the discussions on this matter. The team leader, Mr. John Larrabee, was present and is aware of everything that was said.

[Signed] Tariq AZIZ
Deputy Prime Minister

FAX TRANSMISSION

SPECIAL COMMISSION

Fax: (212)963-3564

AND VC... SANCTIONS CENT...
05 AUG 1998
OUTGOING FAX # P-5142

To: Mr Kamal, NMD

Date: August 5, 1993

Fax #:

Pages: 1, including this cover sheet.

From: John Larrabee

Subject: UNSCOM-242 Request

COMMENTS:

1. The UNSCOM-242 team of experts have recommended that some of the items which were removed from the Dijla Arm River should be taken to foreign laboratories for analysis and verification. The following items have been requested to be moved to the BMVC for packaging and shipment to Bahrain.

242003	Injector head with injectors
242008	Gas generator
242017	Turbo pump wheel
242025	Turbo pump wheel with shaft
242027	Gas generator (2)
242029	Injector head
242035	Air reducer (2)
242063	Oxidizer injector bags (6)
242065	Fuel injector bags (8)
242081	Air reducer
242082	Turbo pump wheel with shaft
242083	Gas generator
242095	Turbo pump wheel (2)
242096	Air reducer (2)
242017	Purging valve (2)
242124	Small part of Iraqi engine

2. I would be most grateful if you would coordinate with the MG-18 team for the removal of these parts from the stores at Karama State Establishment, Khadamiyah Site for transportation to the BMVC as soon as possible.

Regards - John Larrabee, CI, UNSCOM-242

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

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S/1998/727
7 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 43
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Identical letters dated 6 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward herewith a letter dated 5 August 1998 addressed to you from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council and of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Dr. A. G. Ravan FARHÂDI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex I

Letter dated 5 August 1998 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afganistan addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to communicate the following:

The Taliban mercenary group, aided and abetted by Pakistan military intelligence personnel, continue to commit crimes against humanity and crimes of war in the occupied parts of Afghanistan. Based on their retrograde and primitive ideology, justifying themselves by their bigotry and intolerance, ethnic supremacy and chauvinism, the Taliban mercenaries continue to perpetrate heinous crime against civilian population of Afghanistan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan would like to draw your attention to the following acts committed by the Taliban, with the direct involvement of interservices intelligence (ISI) and military personnel of Pakistan, in north-western Afghanistan.

1. Forced deportation.

About four thousand families from the recently invaded city of Maymana, about two thousand families from the Almar and Qaisar districts of Faryab province and about two thousand families from Sheberghan have been deported to western part of Afghanistan.

Two thousand young civilians of Faryab province have been deported to Kandahar, south of the headquarters of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

2. Forced conscription.

The Taliban mercenaries compel the youth of Faryab province to take part in the war against their own people. Already they have imposed forced conscription in the regions under their occupation since 1996.

3. Pillaging and looting of property.

The Taliban mercenaries started extensive appropriation of property belonging to the Uzbek and Tajik residents of newly occupied territories. They are confiscating and transporting their private property to the western part of Afghanistan by military trucks.

4. Attacks on the civilian population.

During their military operations, the Taliban mercenary group intentionally directed attacks against the civilian population and civilian property, as well as individuals not taking direct part in the hostilities.

5. Depriving the civilian population of a means of survival.

The Taliban mercenary group is deliberately trying to inflict on the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan conditions of life calculated to bring about the extermination in whole or in part of these ethnic groups. The continuing Taliban food blockade of the Hazara ethnic group civilian population of central Afghanistan during long months has provided clear evidence of this evil intention.

In addition to this, after the recent occupation of Faryab and Sheberghan, the Taliban have appropriated the carpet weaving tools of the Uzbeks and their herds and transferred it to Kandahar.

The above-mentioned crimes are committed intentionally with the goal of forcing the inhabitants of these provinces to leave their homelands. Since the occupiers are strangers, they are unable to gain the confidence of the population.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan earnestly expects the United Nations to send a fact-finding mission to verify the situation in the north-western part of Afghanistan recently attacked by the Taliban.

We are firmly convinced that the responsibility of the Pakistani Government is fully established in accordance with the General Assembly's definition of aggression of December 1974, which, inter alia, considered as aggression the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries to carry out acts of armed force against another State. Furthermore, owing to the existence of military personnel of Pakistan in the military operations of the Taliban and the expressed declaration of Gohar Ayub Khan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, about the planned occupation of Afghanistan by the mercenaries (see annex II), the responsibility of Pakistan as an aggressor and accomplice in crimes committed in Afghanistan is well established.

Annex II

Pakistan's plan for Afghanistan

The following is a translation of the press interview with the Pakistani Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan, conducted by the Arabic daily, Sharq-alq-Aousat, on 5 August 1998, in London.

Q. Is it right that Pakistan has great sympathy for the Taliban in Afghanistan?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. Why did the Taliban attack northern Afghanistan?

A. Because the Taliban are approaching Mazaar-e-Sharif and it is anticipated that, within the next few days, the city will surrender to the Taliban. The Taliban are gaining increasing victories and they have the support of the civilian population. The Taliban have besieged the city from two sides, from the direction of Sheberghan and Balkh and from the direction of Kunduz.

The Taliban will launch an offensive from Kunduz proceeding towards Hairatan, located on the border with Uzbekistan, and moving on to Pul-I-Khumry, blocking the Saalang Pass and ceasing all contacts with Ahmad Shah Massoud. As such, I predict that in the coming days either Mazaar-e-Sharif will surrender to the Taliban or that intense fighting will take place ... And I hope that no battles will occur.

Q. It seems you are quite aware of the Taliban plan to capture Mazaar-e-Sharif?

A. (Smile, without a word).

Q. Have you given up on the dialogue between the Afghan warring factions?

A. We made active efforts to establish a dialogue between them, but now we must observe the situation on the ground. Only afterwards can we suggest a plan for negotiations. Some Afghan leaders will vanish within days. Or it is possible they will flee Afghanistan, and new realities will come into play. The situation is volatile. One must wait and see what will happen.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/728
7 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 864 (1993) CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola, adopted by the Committee under the no-objection procedure on 7 August 1998 (see annex). The report is being submitted in accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1176 (1998) of 24 June 1998.

(Signed) Bernd H. NIEHAUS
Acting Chairman
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 864 (1993)
concerning the situation in Angola

98-23132 (E) 070898

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Annex

REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 864 (1993) CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA

On 12 June 1998, the Security Council adopted resolution 1173 (1998), by which the Council decided to impose the following additional measures against the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA):

"The Security Council,

...

11. Decides that all States, except Angola, in which there are funds and financial resources, including any funds derived or generated from property of UNITA as an organization or of senior officials of UNITA or adult members of their immediate families designated pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 1127 (1997), shall require all persons and entities within their own territories holding such funds and financial resources to freeze them and ensure that they are not made available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of UNITA as an organization or of senior officials of UNITA or adult members of their immediate families designated pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 1127 (1997);

12. Decides also that all States shall take the necessary measures:

(a) to prevent all official contacts with the UNITA leadership in areas of Angola to which State administration has not been extended, except for those by representatives of the GURN, of the United Nations and of the Observer States to the Lusaka Protocol;

(b) to prohibit the direct or indirect import from Angola to their territory of all diamonds that are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the GURN;

(c) to prohibit, upon notification by the Chairman of the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) to all Member States of guidelines approved by that Committee, the sale or supply to persons or entities in areas of Angola to which State administration has not been extended, by their nationals or from their territory, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of equipment used in mining or mining services;

(d) to prohibit, upon notification by the Chairman of the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) to all Member States of guidelines approved by that Committee, the sale or supply to persons or entities in areas of Angola to which State administration has not been extended, by their nationals or from their territory, or using their flag

vessels or aircraft, of motorized vehicles or watercraft or spare parts for such vehicles, or ground or waterborne transportation services;

...".

By paragraph 2 of resolution 1176 (1998), the aforementioned measures came into force on 1 July 1998.

On 17 July 1998, the Committee adopted, under the no-objection procedure, the revised consolidated guidelines for the conduct of its work, which were transmitted by a note verbale on 21 July 1998 to all States for their information and use as necessary.

In accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 1176 (1998), Member States are required to provide information to the Committee on the measures they have adopted to implement the provisions of paragraphs 11 and 12 of resolution 1173 (1998). Under paragraph 3 of resolution 1176 (1998), the Committee is required to report to the Security Council by 7 August 1998 regarding the actions taken by States to implement these measures.

As of 7 August 1998 replies received from 17 Member States were issued as documents of the Committee as indicated below:

Hungary	2 July 1998	S/AC.31/1998/26
New Zealand	22 July 1998	S/AC.31/1998/27
Sweden	22 July 1998	S/AC.31/1998/28
Norway	24 July 1998	S/AC.31/1998/29
Finland	28 July 1998	S/AC.31/1998/30
Turkey	30 July 1998	S/AC.31/1998/32
Colombia	30 July 1998	S/AC.31/1998/33
Singapore	31 July 1998	S/AC.31/1998/34
Slovakia	31 July 1998	S/AC.31/1998/35
Brazil	3 August 1998	S/AC.31/1998/36
Ukraine	3 August 1998	S/AC.31/1998/37
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	4 August 1998	S/AC.31/1998/38
Sudan	4 August 1998	S/AC.31/1998/39
Germany	4 August 1998	S/AC.31/1998/40
Portugal	6 August 1998	S/AC.31/1998/41
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	31 July 1998	S/AC.31/1998/42
France	6 August 1998	S/AC.31/1998/43

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/729
7 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990) CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of the members of the Council, the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

The report was approved by the Committee on 7 August 1998.

(Signed) M. Denis Dangue RÉWAKA
Acting Chairman
Security Council Committee established
by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the
situation between Iraq and Kuwait

98-23138 (E) 070898

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Annex

Report of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f) of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

1. The present report is submitted by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in accordance with paragraph 6, subparagraph (f) of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 approved by Security Council resolution 700 (1991) of 17 June 1991 (S/22660, annex).

2. Under paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines, the Committee is required to report at 90-day intervals to the Security Council on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq contained in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The present report is the twenty-ninth of such reports submitted under the above-mentioned guidelines.

3. By paragraph 12 of the guidelines, all States are requested to report to the Committee any information that may have come to their attention relating to possible violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq committed by other States or foreign nationals. During the period under review, the Committee has received no such information.

4. By paragraphs 13 and 15 of the guidelines, all States and international organizations are required to consult the Committee on the question of whether certain items fall within the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in cases relating to dual-use or multiple-use items, that is, items meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use. In the period covered by the present report, the Committee has not been consulted by any States or international organizations on the matter.

5. By paragraph 14 of the guidelines, international organizations are requested to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring full compliance with the arms and related sanctions against Iraq, including providing to the Committee any information of this kind that may come to their attention. During the period under review, no information requested by paragraph 14 of the guidelines has been brought to the attention of the Committee.

6. The Committee will continue its efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/730
7 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA).

As members of the Security Council are aware, on 26 June 1998, a tragic air plane accident suddenly took the lives of my Special Representative for Angola, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, five other MONUA staff and two crew members. I wish to place on record my high appreciation for the invaluable and tireless efforts of Mr. Beye and his colleagues, who lost their lives in pursuit of the cause of peace and national reconciliation in Angola. Their untimely deaths represent an incalculable loss for their families, for the United Nations and for the international community.

Following the usual consultations, I wish to inform the Security Council of my intention to appoint Mr. Issa B. Y. Diallo of Guinea as my Special Representative for Angola.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

98-23144 (E) 070898

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/731
7 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 7 August 1998 (S/1998/730) concerning your intention to appoint Mr. Issa B. Y. Diallo (Guinea) as your Special Representative for Angola has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They take note of the intention contained in your letter.

(Signed) Danilo TÜRK
President of the Security Council

98-23150 (E) 070898

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/732
10 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 6 August 1998, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

98-23280 (E) 100898

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Annex

Letter dated 6 August 1998 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), I attach the nineteenth monthly report on operations of the Stabilization Force (SFOR). I would appreciate your making this report available to the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Appendix

Nineteenth monthly report to the Security Council on the operations of the Stabilization Force

1. There are approximately 34,000 troops currently deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, with contributions from all countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, with the departure of Malaysian troops from the theatre at the end of June, from 21 non-NATO countries.

2. Over the reporting period (21 June-20 July), SFOR continued to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance by means of ground and air patrols. Approximately 2,900 sorties were flown by combat aircraft, with the SFOR helicopter fleet flying approximately 117 hours.

3. SFOR has continued to monitor crossing points on the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to inspect government factories in order to help ensure compliance with the prohibition on the transport of weapons established by Security Council resolution 1160 (1998). No reports of non-compliance have been received.

4. Following the restructuring agreement concluded by the Office of the High Representative in February, SFOR has now withdrawn from three transmission towers used by Srpska Radio Television at Duja Nijva, Udrigovo and Leotar. It continued to secure the two remaining towers, at Veliki Zep in Multi-National Division North (MND(N)) and at Trebevic in MND (South-East).

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

5. The parties remain substantially compliant with the most military provisions of the Peace Agreement across the whole area of operations. However, over the reporting period there have again been isolated instances of arson attacks and inter-ethnic tensions.

6. SFOR continues to monitor compliance with the Common Licence Plate Programme and, over the reporting period, confiscated two Bosnian Serb military vehicles for a 30-day period for non-compliance with the Programme.

7. Over the reporting period, SFOR troops conducted a total of 304 military weapons storage site inspections: 75 Bosniac; 57 Bosnian Croat; 144 Bosnian Serb; and 28 Federation. Only minor discrepancies were noted. On 9 July, SFOR confiscated an SA-2 Fan Song radar unit from the Bosnian Serbs following unauthorized radar activity on 21 May in Banja Luka.

8. The Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade (PATB) and the Police Unit for the Protection of Persons and Buildings of the Republika Srpska Specialist Police remain compliant with the terms of the Peace Agreement and with the requirements established by SFOR on 15 August 1997. The Restructuring and Training Programme led by the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and monitored by SFOR began in early June, and 405 PATB officers had completed human dignity training by 11 July.

9. One illegal checkpoint was identified on 5 July and was dismantled without incident.

10. Over the reporting period, SFOR monitored a total of 1,463 training and movement activities: 505 Bosniac; 83 Bosnian Croat; 783 Bosnian Serb; and 92 Federation. SFOR imposed a training and movement ban from 6 to 12 July on Logistic Base 2204 of the Federation armed forces because of non-compliance during an activity conducted on 1 July. In addition, a ban was placed from 8 to 14 July on the 2nd Battalion Training Centre of the Bosnian Croat armed forces because of non-compliance during an exercise conducted from 19 to 30 June.

11. SFOR troops monitored 167 demining operations: 55 Bosniac; 57 Bosnian Croat; and 55 Bosnian Serb. A total of 29 anti-tank mines, 234 anti-personnel mines and 22 items of unexploded ordnance were removed. The lower than normal figures for this period reflect the upgrading and refresher training undertaken by all entity armed forces deminers between 1 and 12 July. All teams returned to the field on 13 July. There are currently no bans imposed on the entity armed forces for non-compliance with demining operations.

Cooperation with international organizations

12. Within its capabilities, SFOR continued to provide assistance to the international organizations in theatre, working routinely with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), IPTF, the Office of the High Representative, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

13. SFOR continues to support OSCE in its preparations for the September elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the provision of a secure environment for voter registration. The registration of parties, candidates and alliances took place as intended by the Provisional Elections Commission without incident.

14. SFOR continues to provide assistance to the Office of the High Representative in the field of civil air traffic. Approval from the Council of Ministers is still awaited for the revisions to the Memorandum of Understanding which will permit cargo operations and allow commercial aircraft to remain overnight at Sarajevo airport. The inaugural flight into Mostar airport took place on 7 July.

15. SFOR continues to play an active role in providing support to the Office of the High Representative's efforts to establish joint institutions, particularly the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM). At the SCMM meeting of 2 July, the programme of work for the coming six months was discussed. Issues to be considered include the potential for joint activities between the entity armed forces and the proposals put forward by SFOR for the use of military helicopters to cross the inter-entity boundary line when carrying senior government officials from the joint institutions and entity governments.

Outlook

16. Tension is expected to rise in the run-up to the September elections. The return of refugees and displaced persons is also likely to be accompanied by increased tension and acts of intimidation and violence. SFOR will continue to help ensure the provision of a secure environment to support and promote returns, in accordance with its mandate.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/733
10 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ERITREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The National Islamic Front (NIF) Government of the Sudan is, as usual, accusing Eritrea (see S/1998/708) of the military operations of Sudanese opposition forces inside Sudan that are fighting against it. It is, as it has in the past, trying to hide its own internal crisis and the pressures it is facing from opposition forces of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army and other forces in the National Democratic Alliance of the Sudan.

It is ironic that the NIF Government of the Sudan, which is a proven political pariah and an instrument of regional and international terrorism and destabilization, is accusing Eritrea of creating regional instability. Its opportunistic accusation now is perhaps timed and concocted in collusion with other forces of aggression in the region in a move to forge an unholy alliance against Eritrea.

We would like to reiterate what we have stated in the past: that the NIF Government of the Sudan has created and continued to arm and infiltrate into Eritrea an assortment of terrorist elements - members of the so-called Islamic jihad. Eritrea stands ready to defend its sovereignty from these or any future Sudanese attacks, and warns the NIF Government from embarking on adventurous dreams against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Eritrea.

Instead of lamely accusing Eritrea or other Governments in the region of the military operations of Sudanese opposition movements whose existence and operations are widely known, the Sudanese Government would be well-advised to head to the peace proposals of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development to solve the internal political problems in the country. Such proposals are supported by the international community as well.

I attach an article from an independent Saudi newspaper where the Sudanese opposition organization, the National Democratic Alliance, claimed in a press statement the operations mentioned in the Sudanese Foreign Minister's letter as its own (see annex). Needless to say, Eritrea categorically denies the baseless and sinister accusations of the Foreign Minister of the Sudan.

I should be grateful if you would kindly circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Haile MENKERIOS
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Article published in Al-Hayat, 4 August 1998

The Sudanese opposition confirms its control of areas along the border with Eritrea

The Sudan Alliance Forces (the opposition in the north) have announced that, the day before yesterday (Sunday), they launched an attack on the area of Al-Laffah (in Kassala province) on the border between the Sudan and Eritrea, overran the command post of the central sector and liberated the area completely.

In a communiqué issued yesterday, a copy of which was received by Al-Hayat in London, the Sudan Alliance Forces added that they "continued their advance to the village of Al-Jirah 12 kilometres south-east of the city of Kassala".

According to the communiqué, eight members of the Sudan Alliance Forces were killed and a number wounded. It also stated that the militias of the Islamic Front (the Sudanese Army) had lost 24 men and that 5 others had been captured.

The communiqué said that Sudanese Antonov aircraft responded to the attack by indiscriminate bombing near Al-Laffah, killing four civilians, but affirmed that the Alliance Forces were "now fully in control of the area and carrying out searches in forward positions from which the militias of the regime had fled".

The communiqué, which was signed by the spokesman for the Sudan Alliance Forces, Fathi Abd Al-Ghaziz, listed artillery and missile weapons, stating that the opposition had captured them during its attack.

The Sudanese Army announced a few days ago that it had repulsed an attack on the border with Eritrea in which Eritrean forces had participated alongside the Sudanese opposition. It claimed that the attack, which had been launched on four fronts, had been contained after heavy fighting.

The day before yesterday, the Sudan made a complaint to the Security Council about Eritrea, in which it accused Eritrea of having shelled a number of Sudanese border villages from inside its territory (Hafarat, Awad, Abu Alga, Galasa) in preparation for an attack on them in which Sudanese opposition forces took part.

In a letter to the President of the Security Council, Mr. Mustafa Osman, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan, expressed the hope that the Council would take steps to prevent Eritrea from continuing "its openly hostile policies towards the Sudan".

However, officials of the Sudanese opposition, in communiqués issued by the joint military command of the National Democratic Alliance, claimed

responsibility for the attack which had targeted areas near the strategic city of Kassala. They also said that Khartoum routinely attributed to Eritrea military operations carried out by the opposition "in order to mislead public opinion and discredit the opposition forces". From its radio station in Asmara the opposition broadcast reports from the areas of operations and voice messages from captured members of the Government forces to their families and relatives in the Sudan.

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A/52/1012
S/1998/734
10 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 61
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 7 August 1998 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 6 August 1998, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Ayŧuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Tuluy TANÇ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

98-23331 (E) 100898

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Annex

Letter dated 6 August 1998 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letters dated 24 and 27 July 1998 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot delegate at the United Nations (A/52/993-S/1998/693, A/52/996-S/1998/696), which contain allegations regarding "violations of the airspace of the Republic".

Similar allegations, which are being put forward constantly to project the false image that the Greek Cypriot administration has sovereignty over the whole of the island, have been refuted in my previous successive communications addressed to you, most recently in my letter dated 28 July 1998 (A/52/999-S/1998/704). I will therefore confine myself to reiterating that flights within the airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place within the sphere of competence and jurisdiction of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus authorities and that the Greek Cypriot side has no say in the matter whatsoever.

The endless barrage of unwarranted and unfounded accusations against the Turkish Cypriot side cannot blur or change the fact that the reckless policy of escalation pursued by the Greek Cypriot side is the real threat to peace and stability in the region. At a time when the Greek Cypriot administration is defiantly ignoring all calls to abandon its plans to deploy the sophisticated S-300 missile system in South Cyprus, allocating military bases for the use of the Greek armed forces and preparing to expand its military purchases even further, it is incumbent upon the international community to give a strong message to the Greek Cypriot leadership with a view to reversing this dangerous and destabilizing trend. The Turkish Cypriot side, for its part, calls upon the Greek Cypriot side, once again, to change its hostile posture, stop the militarization campaign and take the necessary steps towards establishing trust and confidence through mutual respect and recognition of sovereign equality.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ PLÜMER
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/735
10 August 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 10 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note addressed to the delegation sent to Kinshasa by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to conduct a fact-finding mission on the armed conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition.

I should be grateful if you would have this note circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) André Mwamba KAPANGA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-23344 (E) 100898 100898

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Annex

Note addressed to the delegation sent to Kinshasa by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to conduct a fact-finding mission on the armed conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition

I. BACKGROUND

1. On the eve of the accession to power of the Democratic Alliance for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), Mobutu's Zaire was characterized by:

- State bankruptcy, institutionalized depredation and widespread corruption;

- The erosion of the economic base, which was aggravated by the looting episodes of 1991 and 1993;

- Generalized insecurity and public terror orchestrated by an army bent on destroying civil peace;

- The steady deterioration of the population's standard of living, which was accentuated by the resurgence of epidemics and high infant mortality;

- Deliberate reduction of young people's school enrolment with a view to spreading ignorance, which was considered the foundation for the continuance of the established order.

2. The influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees into the country's eastern provinces following the rise to power of the Tutsis in Kigali further exacerbated the problem of security along the Congolese-Rwandan border.

3. It was in this context that AFDL was established for the purpose of ending the Mobutu dictatorship, whose responsibility for the impoverishment of the Congolese people had been recognized.

4. Formed by the political forces hostile to Mobutu, but lacking the resources needed for the achievement of its objective, AFDL accepted military and logistical assistance from friendly countries, including Rwanda and Uganda.

5. These two countries stood to gain by this assistance, insofar as the war of liberation envisaged by AFDL would remove from their borders the sources of tension that were jeopardizing their security.

6. Fifteen months after AFDL took power, the Congolese Government, considering that order and security had been restored within its borders, decided to end the Rwandan military presence within the Congolese armed forces.

7. This decision by the Congolese Government, which Kigali nonetheless claims to have supported, constituted, for the Ugandan-Rwandan coalition, the spark that touched off the armed conflict with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

II. THE FACTS

8. The repatriation of Rwandan soldiers had barely been completed when the Democratic Republic of the Congo became the victim of acts of aggression perpetrated by Rwanda and its allies.

9. Military convoys consisting of many Rwandan army trucks full of heavily armed soldiers violated the Congolese borders to surround the towns of Goma and Bukavu on 2 and 3 August 1998.

10. As these events were unfolding in the eastern part of the country, in Kinshasa a group of Rwandan soldiers who had eluded the repatriation operation stormed the Tshiatshi and Kokolo camps.

11. In Kisangani, again during the night of Sunday, 2 August and Monday, 3 August 1998, another group of Rwandan soldiers, who were awaiting repatriation, opened fire on the Kisangani garrison.

12. To complete this tragic picture, three Boeing aircraft operated by private Congolese companies - Congo Airlines, LAC and Blue Airlines - were hijacked on their departure from Goma on Tuesday, 4 August 1998 by James Kaberede, a Rwandan who, until July 1998, had assumed the functions of Chief of Staff a.i. of the Congolese Armed Forces. The aircraft landed in Kitona, where between 600 and 800 Rwandans disembarked. Their goal is to:

(a) Try to win the support of the Congolese troops at that base;

(b) Strangle Kinshasa by seizing areas such as the port of Matadi, which is vitally important for the capital;

(c) Surround the Inga hydroelectric dam, which provides electric power to Kinshasa and to the mining operations in Katanga, as well as to a number of other countries in southern and central Africa.

13. This past Sunday, 9 August 1998, two armed columns consisting of tanks, armoured cars and trucks full of soldiers proceeded from Uganda towards the town of Bunia.

III. RESPONSIBILITIES

14. It is clear that the aggression being perpetrated against the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the work of the Rwandan-Ugandan coalition.

15. What is being presented as a Banyamulenge insurrection is nothing more nor less than a crude disguise to mask the destabilizing manoeuvres of Mr. Museveni

and Mr. Kagame, whose expansionist ambitions with regard to our territory no longer need to be demonstrated.

16. We can affirm that the Banyamulenge, a Congolese tribe which is a small minority numbering fewer than 50,000 people, do not have the human resources, much less the financial means, to raise an army capable of setting the entire Congolese territory ablaze.

17. Rwanda and Uganda have incurred full international responsibility for this conflict in that they are acting in violation of the relevant provisions of the Charters of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), both of which recognize the inviolability of every State's borders and political independence.

IV. POSITION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

18. We request the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to use their respective prerogatives to demand that Rwanda and Uganda withdraw their troops immediately.

19. The Democratic Republic of the Congo does not wish to make war with any State. It is merely defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Consequently, should the aggressors fail to withdraw their troops, the Democratic Republic of the Congo vows to use every means at its disposal to end this aggression.

20. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo reiterates its willingness to guarantee fully its responsibility towards all foreigners, be they Rwandans or Ugandans, who have chosen to live on Congolese soil. The sweep operations under way in certain Congolese towns are being conducted for the sole purpose of neutralizing the web of complicity which the aggressors have woven within the country.

21. The head of State, His Excellency Mr. Laurent-Désiré Kabila, as well as the Government of National Security, have repeatedly expressed their determination to take firm and resolute action to bring the current democratization process to fruition. Our wish is that the current crisis be brought promptly to an end so that it will not disturb the normal conduct of this process.

V. WHAT THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO EXPECTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

- That an investigation be opened in the necessary conditions of objectivity and independence;

- That Rwanda and Uganda be condemned, in accordance with the provisions of the Charters of the United Nations and of OAU;

- That the United Nations and OAU use every means at their disposal to demand the withdrawal of Ugandan-Rwandan troops from Congolese territory.

(Signed) David M'BWANKIEM
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs